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José Luis Bermúdez has been working on the notion of self and self-
consciousness for the last two decades. In this book, Understanding “I”: 
Thought and Language, he is tackling the conceptual notion of self and 
self-consciousness. In order to fully understand things that Bermúdez is 
saying in this book and why he is saying them we need to look at some of 
his earlier works.
Bermúdez wrote four major philosophical books and numerous articles 
and publications. These books are (in chronological order): The Paradox of 
Self-Consciousness (1997), Thinking without Words (2003), Decision Theo-
ry and Rationality (2009) and Understanding “I”: Thought and Language 
(2017).1 The two “middle books”, Thinking without Words and Decision 
Theory and Rationality, are not directly relevant to the book in question: 
Understanding “I”: Thought and Language. In Thinking without Words 
Bermúdez is trying to uncover the ontological status and syntactic struc-
ture of thoughts that prelinguistic creatures posses (prelinguistic infants, 
early hominids and animals). In Decision Theory and Rationality Bermú-
dez is trying to demonstrate that rationality can not be explain by any form 
of decision theory. The only other book in which Bermúdez is exploring the 
notion of self and self-consciousness (directly) is his fi rst book: The Paradox 
of Self-Consciousness. As it was said at the beginning, in order to evalu-
ate and understand his latest work, Understanding “I”: Thought and Lan-
guage, we need to spend some time looking at his previous work, namely, 
The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.
The Paradox of Self-Consciousness is a book dedicated to resolving 
what Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness. Now, the point of 
the paradox is that an account of self-consciousness cannot avoid circular-
ity, may this circularity be explanatory or constitutive. In order to give an 
1 There are four types od publications that are not included in this categorization. 
Firstly, books that are classifi ed as introductions (Philosophy of Psychology: A 
Contemporary Introduction (2005), Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science 
of the Mind (2013; 2014)), secondly, books which Bermúdez is not a sole author of 
(The Body and the Self (1998)), thirdly, books that are focused on a single author 
(Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans 
(2005)), and lastly minor publications like articles and essays that are not full-
fl edged books. This exclusion enables us to track the author’s thoughts on the subject 
more precisely.
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adequate account of self-consciousness we need to analyse our capacity to 
think what he calls ‘I’-thoughts. What are ‘I’-thoughts? ‘I’-thoughts are a 
special way (an ability or a capacity) we think about ourselves, involving 
concepts and descriptions, that we cannot put to work in thinking about 
other people and things—namely, the ability to apply those concepts and 
descriptions uniquely to ourselves. The capacity to think ‘I’-thoughts is also 
fundamental in Understanding “I”: Thought and Language. So, where is 
the paradox? The paradox consists in the following: In order to analyse the 
capacity to think ‘I’-thoughts we need to analyse the ability to use the fi rst-
person pronoun which seems to require analyzing the capacity to think ‘I’-
thoughts. And here we have circularity. In order to resolve the dreadful 
paradox Bermúdez is, throughout the entire book, constructing the notion 
of prelinguistic self-consciousness.
Firstly, Bermúdez rejects what he calls The Conceptual Requirement 
Principle. The Conceptual Requirement Principle states that the range of 
contents which is permissible to attribute to a creature is directly deter-
mined by the concepts which that creature possesses. By doing so the au-
thor is stipulating the existence of a nonconceptual content. A nonconcep-
tual content is a form of mental content which can be ascribed to a bearer 
of that content, without that bearer having to possess the concepts required 
to specify that content.
Secondly, Bermúdez accepts J. J. Gibson’s notion of visual perception 
through his ecological approach. Briefl y, he extracts from Gibson’s work the 
notion of self that is based on spatial self-awareness, like the one in naviga-
tion, awareness of orientation and trajectory.
Thirdly, Bermúdez is using the notion of somatic proprioception. So-
matic proprioception is a form of perception that provides to the perceiver 
detailed information about the perciver′s position, movement, limb disposi-
tion, and other bodily properties. For example: information about balance 
and posture, bodily disposition and muscular fatigue.
Lastly, Bermúdez is arguing, based on the relevant research, for the 
existence of prelinguistic social self-awareness. Prelinguistic social self-
awareness is manifested in phenomena like joint selective visual attention 
and coordinated joint engagement which we can observe in infants.2
Thus, at the end of his book The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Ber-
múdez has constructed a solid ground for the notion of prelinguistic self-
consciousness.
So, what’s the point? The point is that in The Paradox of Self-Conscious-
ness Bermúdez, in order to solve the paradox, uses the notions of nonconcep-
tual content, somatic proprioception, visual kinaesthetics etc. to explore the 
notion of prelinguistic self-consciousness that lies beneath the surface of the 
iceberg (to use Bermúdez’s metaphor from the preface of his current book). 
Now, nineteen years later Bermúdez, in his current book: Understanding 
“I”: Thought and Language, returns to investigate the conceptual notion of 
self and self-consciousness. After discussing the notion of prelinguistic self-
consciousness, he now investigates the surface of the iceberg – full-fl edged 
linguistic (conceptual) self-consciousness.
2 Certainly, the last four paragraphs cannot adequately present the argument 
put forward by Bermúdez in The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. For a clear and full 
view of Bermúdez’s argument, please see The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (1997).
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Understanding “I”: Thought and Language is structured in the follow-
ing manner. The book has seven chapters (excluding the preface) and each 
chapter has between three to fi ve subchapters. These seven chapters are:
1. “I”: An essential indexical
2. Sense and understanding
3. Frege and Evans on the sense of “I”
4. Privacy, objectivity, symmetry
5. Token-sense and type-sense
6. I”: Token-sense and type-sense
7. Explaining immunity to error through misidentifi cation
The structure of Understanding “I” is silmilar to the structure of The Para-
dox in the following way. In both books, Bermúdez uses different tools, like 
constraints, conditions and criteria, in order to converge at the end of the 
book in a single exposition. In The Paradox it is an argument that solves the 
paradox of the title and in Understanding “I” it is the set of conditions that 
bring about the concept of “I”. The structure is different in books like Think-
ing without Words and Decision Theory and Rationality. In Thinking the 
main point is in explaining the notion of nonlinguistic thought throughout 
ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language and in Decision Theory 
Bermúdez’s goal was to prove that no decision theory can satisfy the neces-
sary conditions for rationality.
Understanding “I” has a solid and clear structure overall, with chapters 
nicely complementing each other. The only objection could be the status 
of the last chapter: Explaining immunity to error through misidentifi ca-
tion. In chapter six: “I”: Token-sense and type-sense Bermúdez makes the 
main and fi nal point of the book so the last chapter does not close the book 
properly. It would probably be better if chapter seven preceded chapter six. 
Understanding “I” employs the following methodology. Bermúdez does not 
engage in the ontology of selfhood in a straightforward manner. This is true 
for The Paradox as well. Instead, he is based on the presupposition that 
the self is embodied. That statement is widely and thoroughly explained 
and defended in The Paradox. In Understanding “I” Bermúdez takes the 
presupposition as face value.3 Bermúdez’s primary focus is on the complex 
interrelations between the epistemology of self-consciousness and its func-
tional role. And the way to approach the epistemology and functional role 
of self-consciousness is through an account of what it is to understand the 
fi rst person pronoun.
In his fi rst chapter, “I”: An essential indexical, Bermúdez makes three 
main points. These points are: the Expressibility principle, Essential in-
dexicality and the ineliminability of “I”. The Expressibility principle sim-
ply states that any thinkable thought can in principle be linguistically ex-
pressed without residue or remainder. This is mostly uncontroversial. The 
principle is restricted in application to conceptual thoughts. It does not claim 
that there are no inexpressible truths, just that if there are inexpressible 
truths they are also unthinkable. What the Expressibility principle does 
3 For the clear and full view of the proposition in question see The Paradox of Self-
Consciousness (1997), especially chapter six: Somatic Proprioception and the Bodily 
Self.
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philosophically is the following. It sets up an equivalence between enter-
taining “I” thoughts and understanding “I” sentences. The second point that 
he makes is Essential indexicality. In Bermúdez’s words:
Essential indexicality (agency): An agent will not typically act upon beliefs about 
herself unless she knows, through some thought that can only be expressed using 
“I”, that she herself is the person those beliefs are about. Essential indexicality 
(explanation): When explaining an action in terms of the agent’s beliefs about 
herself, at least one of those beliefs must have as its content an “I”-thought, viz. a 
thought that can only be expressed using “I”. (Bermúdez 2017: 9)
Bermúdez claims that “I” thoughts are fundamental in two relevant and 
distinctive ways. Firstly; “I” thoughts are the ones motivating an agent, 
which is called Essential indexicality (agency), and secondly; “I” thoughts 
are used in explaining an action, which is called Essential indexicality (ex-
planation). The point Bermúdez is making is that “I” thoughts are funda-
mental because they integrate the agent’s beliefs about the world with her 
own fi rst person perspective on the world.
From here he makes his fi nal point that “I” thoughts are ineliminable 
and that any explanation of action without an essential indexical is neces-
sarily incomplete.
In chapter two, Sense and understanding, Bermúdez is looking at two 
positions regarding the meaning of a sentence. Firstly, we have a Fregean 
position which states that the semantic value of a name is a concept that 
mediates between the name and its referent. That concept might be ex-
pressed by a defi nite description and Frege called it a sense.4 Secondly, we 
have Russell/Mill’s position which states that the semantic value of a name 
is simply its referent. Here Bermúdez is taking the “middle ground” which 
he calls the hybrid view. In the hybrid view Bermúdez keeps the notion of 
sense, but he is talking of sense as understanding. In Bermúdez’s words:
The sense of an expression, whether that expression is a proper name, a logical 
constant, a predicate or a complete sentence, is what a competent language-user 
understands when he understands that expression. (Bermúdez 2017: 26)
The chapter is structurally very similar to the second chapter of Bermúdez’s 
Thinking without Words where he discusses the nature of thought. There 
Bermúdez is also looking at two clashing positions; the Fregean approach: 
thoughts as the senses of sentences and the Fodor approach: the language 
of thought hypothesis.5
In chapters three and four (Frege and Evans on the sense of “I” and Pri-
vacy, objectivity, symmetry) Bermúdez sets out an exposition of Frege’s no-
tion of the sense of “I” and Evans’s notion of the sense of “I”. Frege breaks 
the notion of the sense of “I” in two. We have a private sense of “I” and a 
public sense of “I”. A private sense of “I” is a special way in which I am 
presented to myself, and that sense is special, private and unshareable. A 
public sense of “I” is a linguistic device used for communication and under-
standing, and its shareable.
4 Bermúdez is using the term Fregean sense: The standard view which does not 
necessarily correspond with something we might call the Fregean sense: The classical 
view which would defi nitely have to involve some sort of Platonism.
5 For the clear and full view of the discussion in question see Thinking without 
Words (2003), especially chapter two: Two Approaches to the Nature of Thought.
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There are three key components of Evans’s notion of the sense of “I” 
that Bermúdez has highlighted. Firstly, Evans follows Frege regarding the 
notion of the sense of “I”. Secondly Evans claims that the sense of “I” is 
private, but objective, which means that “I” thoughts should exist indepen-
dently from anyone thinking them,. Thirdly, Evans uses immunity to error 
through misidentifi cation relative to the fi rst person pronoun (the IEM prop-
erty) in his explanation of “I” thoughts.6 The IEM property is a special kind 
of property that “I” thoughts have (arguably not all of them) which states 
that one cannot think an ‘I’-thought without knowing that it is in fact about 
oneself. ‘I’-thought cannot fail to identify the bearer of that thought. An 
example is the following:
1. John Smith thinks: I am sitting in a chair.
2. John Smith thinks: John Smith is sitting in a chair.
In (1) there is an “I” thought with an IEM property and in (2) there is an “I” 
thought without an IEM property.7
Bermúdez ultimately rejects both accounts: Frege’s and Evans’s, respec-
tively. Frege’s account of “I” thoughts is rejected because “I” thoughts that 
can tell us about self-consciousness (private sense of “I”) are private and un-
shareable. Evans’s account of “I” thoughts is rejected because “I” thoughts 
(according to Evans) can exist independently from anyone thinking them. 
So, what does Bermúdez take from Frege and Evans? From Frege he takes 
the concept of sense (in a manner described in chapter two) and from Evans 
he takes the IEM property.
Based on his interpretation of Frege and Evans, in chapter four: Privacy, 
objectivity, symmetry, Bermúdez makes (arguably) his most controversial 
claim of this book: The Symmetry Constraint.
The Symmetry Constraint: An account of the sense of “I” must allow tokens of “I” 
to have the same sense as tokens of other personal pronouns such as “you” in ap-
propriate contexts. (Bermúdez 2017: 53).
Bermúdez offers three arguments in defence of The Symmetry Constraint: 
the same-saying argument, the logical argument and the epistemological 
argument. The same-saying argument states the following. In understand-
ing a sentence one acquires knowledge of what that sentence says. That 
knowledge can be reported by a sentence that says the same thing as the 
original sentence. And fi nally, if one sentence accurately reports another, 
then we can reasonably assume that they express the same thought. The 
logical argument states that the possibility of equivalence in sense between 
fi rst and second person pronouns is required for meaningful disagreement. 
Example that Bermúdez provides is that when I say “What you claim is 
false” and you say “What I claim is not false” then I seem to be denying 
what you are asserting. Lastly, the epistemological argument states that 
we need communication in order to transmit knowledge. So, in the right 
circumstances, when I hear you say something gives me a reason to believe 
6 For a more detailed account of Bermúdez’s thoughts on Evans see Thought, 
Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans (2005).
7 For additional clarifi cation regarding IEM see James Pryor: Immunity to error 
through misidentifi cation (1999), Simon Prosser and François Recanati: Immunity to 
Error through Misidentifi cation: New Essays (2012).
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it and, if true, it counts as knowledge. Then it follows that the content in 
both cases is the same. 
There are several reasons for concern regarding The Symmetry Con-
straint. Firstly, The Symmetry Constraint is highly context sensitive. 
Bermúdez seems to be aware of this fact. That is why his defi nition ends 
with: in appropriate contexts. Nevertheless, it takes a certain amount of 
explanatory power away from the constraint in question. Secondly, it could 
be argued that Bermúdez takes Frege’s notion of sense too far and that this 
notion of sense would be unrecognizable to Frege. Lastly, The Symmetry 
Constraint could be seen as very strange and counter-intuitive. It seems to 
us that I and you cannot have the same sense.
In chapter fi ve, Token-sense and type-sense, after installing The Sym-
metry Constraint, Bermúdez takes a necessary course of action: he breaks 
the notion of sense in two. On the one hand there is a token-sense: what a 
speaker or hearer understands when they understand a particular utter-
ance of “I” in a particular context and on the other hand there is a type-
sense: what allows a speaker to be described as understanding the linguis-
tic expression “I”. Or in the context when we are talking about grasping the 
truth condition of a sentence involving indexicals:
Grasping the type-sense of an indexical requires:
(a) being aware of how the reference of the indexical is determined by the 
context of utterance (b) knowing in general terms what it would be for the 
sentence featuring the indexical to be true (without necessarily being able to 
identify the referent of the indexical)
Grasping the token-sense of an indexical requires: (a) being able to exploit 
features of the context of utterance to determine the reference of the indexi-
cal (b) knowing a specifi c truth condition (where this requires being able to 
identify the referents of the indexical) (Bermúdez 2017: 64)
There are two important questions to be asked here. Firstly, why is break-
ing the notion of sense in two relevant or useful? Secondly, why is this dis-
tinction (token-sense/ type-sense) different from other distinctions of the 
same type (Frege, Perry and Kaplan)? Bermúdez is claiming that we need 
the distincion in order to put forward a meaningful account of conceptual 
self-consciousness. He also claims that he is solving more problems than 
Frege, Perry and Kaplan. We will see why when we take a look at the next 
chapter.
Chapter six, “I”: Token-sense and type-sense, is the main chapter of the 
book. It is here that Bermúdez summons all the parts of previous chapters 
and presents his notion of conceptual self-consciousness through under-
standing the sense of “I”. In order to have a satisfactory account of the sense 
of “I” (token-sense and type-sense) we need to satisfy fi ve constraints.
Constraint 1 (Essential Indexicality): Explain the distinctive cognitive role 
of “I”-thoughts, as refl ected in the two principles Essential Indexicality 
(Agency) and Essential Indexicality (Explanation).
Constraint 2 (Shareability): Allow thoughts containing the sense of “I” to be 
shareable.
Constraint 3 (Symmetry): Allow tokens of “I” to have the same sense as to-
kens of other personal pronouns such as “you” in appropriate contexts.
Constraint 4 (Frege’s Criterion): Individuate senses in accordance with 
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Frege’s criterion, so that no two token-senses can be the same if it is possible 
for a rational thinker to take incompatible attitudes to them.
Constraint 5 (Truth Conditions): Accommodate the distinction between 
knowing in general terms what it would be for the sentence featuring the 
indexical to be true (without necessarily being able to identify the referent 
of the indexical) and knowing a specifi c truth condition (where this requires 
being able to identify the referents of the indexical). (Bermúdez 2017: 74–75)
Bermúdez claims that his account of the sense of “I” satisfi es the fi ve con-
straints. This is the main reason why his believes that his account of the 
sense of “I” solves more problems and has a greater explanatory power from 
the other accounts (Frege, Perry and Kaplan). As said before, Constraint 3 
(Symmetry) is probably the most controversial of them.
In his last chapter, Explaining immunity to error through misidentifi ca-
tion, Bermúdez presents his account for the IEM property. According to 
Bermúdez not all “I” thoughts have the IEM property. He claims that jug-
ments with “I” as subject (which are conceptual) have the IEM property 
because they are based on identifi cation-free sources (which are noncon-
ceptual). Identifi cation-free sources are: introspection, somatic propriocep-
tion/kinesthesis, visual proprioception/kinesthesis and autobiographical 
memory.
This is quite a bold claim. The point that Bermúdez is making is that 
the nature of the IEM property does not rest upon the indexical but on the 
predicate. It is a special way of receiving information (from identifi cation-
free sources) that gives rise to a special kind of predicates that makes the 
IEM property. The question still remainds: Why is it the case that only 
judgments that contain a special kind of predicates that are based on a spe-
cial way of receiving information (introspection, somatic proprioception/kin-
esthesis, visual proprioception/kinesthesis and autobiographical memory) 
have the IEM property?
Understanding “I”: Thought and Language is overall a concisely written 
and well-structured book. Bermúdez builds his case precisely and methodi-
cally. In each chapter, Bermúdez argues a specifi c case that is later used as 
a component for the construction of his notion of conceptual self-conscious-
ness. The exception is the fi nal chapter that does not conclude the book 
properly because it opens a potentially new subject. At the end the question 
arises: Does Bermúdez’s account of conceptual self-consciousness work? The 
answer will be in a form of a question: Does it solve more problems than it 
creates? And that is up to the reader to decide.
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